

**JEWISH PRIMARY DAY SCHOOL
OF THE NATION'S CAPITAL**

**PERSPECTIVES ON PEACE AND WAR:
A CONVERSATION WITH LEON WIESELTIER**

YITZHAK RABIN MEMORIAL LECTURE

**WELCOME:
HELAINÉ GREENFELD,
PRESIDENT,
JEWISH PRIMARY DAY SCHOOL**

**SHELTON ZUCKERMAN,
FOUNDER,
JEWISH PRIMARY DAY SCHOOL**

**INTRODUCTION:
NAOMI REEM,
HEAD OF SCHOOL,
JEWISH PRIMARY DAY SCHOOL**

**MODERATOR:
LEON WIESELTIER,
LITERARY EDITOR,
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**SPEAKER:
CONDOLEEZZA RICE,
FORMER U.S. SECRETARY OF STATE**

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SIXTH AND I HISTORIC SYNAGOGUE

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HELAINÉ GREENFELD: Good evening. If you have any more questions, be sure to have passed them to the sides, and if you have a cell-phone on, please turn it off. My name is Helaine Greenfeld, I'm the president of JPDS, and I'd like to welcome you to the fourth annual Yitzhak Rabin Memorial Lecture, the Jewish Primary Day School of the nation's capital.

This lecture was begun by our past president, Jeff Colman, in collaboration with the Rabin family on the occasion of the 10th anniversary of Yitzhak Rabin's death, and we are proud to have partnered with his family and continue to cooperate with them. As the only Jewish day school in the nation's capital, our school plays a critical role in the life of the city, as we educate a rapidly increasing number of students and as we establish our school as a pillar in the community.

At a time when demand for so much is going down, the demand for a JPDS education is going up to record levels, and we are proud of what that says about our school, its staff, its faculty and its students. Secretary Rice this afternoon saw just how special our students are. She's one of the most sophisticated and well-traveled women in the world, but she may have met her match when she spent some time with the fourth, fifth and sixth graders and got to see how curious, engaged and well-rounded they are, not to mention more well-traveled and knowledgeable about politics than most elementary school students.

This evening's lecture represents and continues our commitment to extending the educational opportunities we offer to the broader community and to serving as a partner with other pillars of the community, such as the Sixth & I Historic Synagogue. Our Rabin Lecture Series is part of a wider school program honoring the legacy of Yitzhak Rabin. Through this lecture and corresponding curriculum in special programming at our school, the issues of peace, conflict resolution and Israeli history come to life. We are privileged and honored to have the Honorable Condoleezza Rice with us this evening to share her experiences in the Middle East and to give insight into the use of education as a tool for peace.

Thank you to all of the parents and staff of the Jewish Primary Day School who gave up their time to make this event a success, especially our co-chairs Laurie Moskowitz, Steve Rabinowitz and Leon Wieseltier. I'd also like to thank Amy Kriz (ph) and Rachel Deckter (ph) for the hard work that they did to make this evening so lovely. I would like to also thank the Sixth & I Historic Synagogue for partnering with us in this lecture. And now I'll call upon Shelton Zuckerman, one of the founders of this incredible institution and a man whose three grandchildren will be entering JPDS in the fall, to share some words with you. Thank you.

(Applause.)

SHELTON ZUCKERMAN: Good evening to you all and thank you very much for being here. When my friend Abe Pollin and I began operating Sixth & I after the restoration, we really had no idea of, you know, how it was going to play out. But we did know a couple things: We

wanted it to be open, we wanted it to be community-based, we wanted it to take a role in the Jewish community and also in the greater D.C. community. And I think to that end, we've been very fortunate and been successful.

To toot our own horn for just one second, Newsweek Magazine just named Sixth & I one of the 25 most vibrant synagogues in the United States. (Applause.) I have to just say one personal thing to you. When I heard that, I was a little nervous, because I remembered back when I was in the fifth grade and I was in a D.C. public athletic school athletic event, and I called my mom and said, mom, I came in third in the 60-yard dash, and she said, that's wonderful, but how many people were in the dash? And unfortunately, there were only three of us. So I looked up on Google, there are 3,727 synagogues in the United States. (Applause.)

One of the things that we've been able to do here that's made us successful is form partnerships with organizations like the Jewish Primary Day School that have a real place in the Jewish community and in the greater community and in the educational process of District of Columbia residents, and we're really proud of this, along with a number of the other people that we deal with, and we're so happy to have you and of course, Dr. Rice.

One little thing for Dr. Rice, who – I read one time that when the board of directors got together and decided to build this facility, this was their second synagogue, they raised amongst the board members that evening \$25. They took the \$25 and went out and bought a piano and raffled it off. They got \$50 for that piano, Dr. Rice, and we don't have that particular one, but as I twisted your arm downstairs, one of these days, we'd love to have you up here with another piano.

Anyway, it's our pleasure to have you guys here, and I want to have Dr. Rice introduced by Naomi Reem, who will do the honors. Thank you so much.

(Applause.)

NAOMI REEM: As an educator and a woman with three home nations, Argentina, Israel and the United States, I am so honored to share the evening with Dr. Condoleezza Rice, a premier educator, a woman who was brought together nations throughout the world with the goal of peace and harmony.

Our school brings to life each day the legacy of Yitzhak Rabin, and the teachers – the teachings of our sages that knowledge brings peace and contentment to the world and that we, as a people, are responsible for taking risks to repair the world. The Talmud, our great book of oral traditions, teaches us that students of the Torah increase this in the world. According to the Talmud, it is through knowledge, study and the connection to the divine that peace will come, and it is our children, filled with knowledge, that will be the future of peace.

Each Shabbat, many of us read the following passage reminding us that it's through our children that peace will come. (In Hebrew.) May all of our children bring peace and joy to Israel and to the world.

(Applause.)

CONDOLLEEZZA RICE: Thank you very much. Thank you, thank you. Thank you very much, and I would very much to thank all who have made this evening possible, and my good friend Leon. We've known each other for, I think, the better part now of close to 30 years, and he is, of course, a force, and I'm delighted that he's here to ask questions and to lead a conversation. So I will not make my remarks so long, because I think we should try and have a dialogue about the many issues that we face.

I just want to point out – Naomi, first of all, thank you for the beautiful words that you just said, but also, I was at the school today, and these kids are terrific. They are energetic and they're articulate and they're willing to speak up, and I even found one young girl who said that her passion was algebra. Now, that's quite a long way from my own experience, but nonetheless, it shows that good things are being done at JPDS.

I thought I might just, for one moment, talk a little bit about the context of the Middle East, because after all, this is the Yitzhak lecture, a man whose name, in many ways, is synonymous with peace; someone who loved dearly the state of Israel, who had fought for the state of Israel and yet was determined to try and make peace and to create an environment in the Middle East in which all peoples, Jewish and Muslim and Christian, and people who were nothing at all, might be able to live together, side-by-side, in peace and security.

There are times when that vision of the Middle East seems quite far away, and I know that it's easy to lose hope that in fact that vision of the Middle East will ever prevail. But I'd just like to suggest that we step back for a moment and take a look at several scenes that are now there in the Middle East that might in fact, if not tomorrow, soon, lead to a very much better Middle East.

Let me start by saying that I am one who believes that history has a long arc, not a short one. Whenever I was asked to judge – usually in some press conference in a fairly aggressive way, well, what will be history's judgment of the Bush administration, and I would say, well, we're actually not even out of office yet, can we put this off for a little while? But I would remind people that today's headlines and history's judgments are rarely the same, and that one has to, in order to keep enough optimism to keep going, think about other impossible things, things that seemed impossible at the time, that we now just think are inevitable.

I was, from 1989 to 1991, lucky enough to be the White House Soviet specialist at the end of the Cold War, and frankly, it doesn't get much better than that. I got to be there for the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe. I was in Gdansk, in – listening to Polish workers chanting, freedom, freedom, freedom and knowing that Karl Marx was done in Poland. I could see, as James Baker signed the German Unification Documents that brought German whole and free, back into the center of Europe, but this time on democratic values, not on the values that had led Germany to be such a destructive force over decades.

I also witnessed the peaceful collapse of the Soviet Union. One day the hammer and sickle just came down, the tricolor went up, never mind 75 years of communism. Now, I had to

remind myself that as good as that felt, we were really just harvesting decisions that had been made earlier in history, and I would ask my colleagues at the State Department to do a thought experiment. Think about going to work in the State Department in 1946, when the Italian communist had won 48 percent of the vote and the French communist 46 percent of the vote. And the question wasn't, would Eastern Europe be communist, it was, would Western Europe be communist?

In 1947, when 2 million Europeans were still starving, necessitating the Marshall Plan, when civil war broke out in Greece; in 1948, when the Berlin Crisis threatened and did in fact split Germany; Czechoslovakia fell to a communist coup; and Harry Truman made the fateful decision to recognize Israel, a decision that was resisted and opposed by even his great secretary of state, George Marshall.

And in 1949, when the Soviet Union exploded a nuclear weapon five years ahead of schedule, the Chinese communist won, and in 1950, the Korean War broke out. Do you think that anybody would have believed that in 1991 the Soviet Union would go away without firing a shot and that in 2006 I would have the great pleasure and honor of attending a summit in Latvia, a NATO summit in Latvia, with the president of the United States?

And so history has a long arc, and I want to suggest to you that the arc in the Middle East over the last several years has really been an interesting one. When we came into office in the year 2001, there was – the most dominant factor in the Middle East was the raging Second Intifada, an intifada that was killing thousands of people, an intifada that had suicide bombs going off not in the West Bank but in Tel Aviv. An intifada that had largely been brought about by Yasser Arafat, a man who was – had terrorism – had one foot in terrorism and the other foot in corruption and who was determined not to make peace in Israel. That was the dominant picture, was the intifada.

So matter of fact, an intifada so bad that I can – will never forget a tank shell that went off in Bethlehem, in Nativity Square, blowing a hole in the Church of the Nativity. There was no democracy debate in the Middle East to speak of; people didn't use the word. We were told that somehow, the Middle East was an exception, that even though democracy was growing in places like Latin America and even in Africa, the Middle East somehow – it was not consistent with Islam to talk about democracy, and it was certainly not America's place to insist on democratization of the Middle East, leaving, therefore, Lebanon as the only democratic Muslim state in the Arab world and Israel as the only other democracy in the Middle East.

Saddam Hussein was still in power: 300,000 people in mass graves, threatening the world, threatening his neighbors, shooting at American aircraft, an implacable enemy of the United States. Syrian forces were in Lebanon, 30 years having occupied that country and refused it even a modicum of sovereignty. And of course, Iran was growing in influence, unchecked and unrecognized for its nuclear ambitions. And underneath the circus of all of it, in this place in which there was a freedom gap and an absence of freedom, an absence of places for decent politics to take place because of authoritarian governments, the virulent strain of politics was growing up.

It was politics, but it was in radical mosques and in radical madrasahs, and its most virulent strain, of course, was al Qaeda, which would come home to harm the United States on September 11th. Now, I would suggest to you that that Middle East was by no means a pleasant Middle East, although at times I've heard stories about how the Middle East has gotten so much worse, I have to say, worse than what, because the Middle East of 2001 was not at all a hopeful place.

And it's still a difficult place, but now there is a democracy debate, and women do have the right to vote in Kuwait. And even in Saudi Arabia, there are councils to which women appeal, to the king himself on certain – in certain matters. Today, there is a democracy debate by activists in places like Egypt, who are determined to turn their authoritarian regime toward the face of greater popular legitimacy. Saddam Hussein, of course, is gone. And let me be very clear, I understand that there were many, many people who did not agree with the decision to liberate Iraq. That is understandable and is totally appropriate in our democratic society to have that debate.

But it is also true that today, Iraq, the geo-strategically most important country in the world, given its position, where it sits as a bulwark to Iran, is run not by a murderous tyrant, but by a, to be sure, fragile, multi-confessional democratic leadership that actually is a friend of the United States', that will not use weapons of mass destruction and will not attack its neighbors. That, I think, is for us a strategic improvement in the circumstances. And it is, by the way, still a bulwark against Iran, because despite extraordinary Iranian pressures, they signed a strategic agreement with the United States.

And of course, in Lebanon, Syrian forces are gone. Yes, Hezbollah is a strong political force, but the Lebanese army is throughout the country, and Lebanese sovereignty has been restored, and there is a Lebanese government that is actually very pro-Western and pro-American in the majority – by just a little bit, but nonetheless, in the majority. And finally, Iran has been seen to be what it is. Through four Security Council resolutions, we finally got into the place that Iran is seen as the problem, not the United States and not others.

And what about al Qaeda? Well, al Qaeda still exists, and it is still lethal, but it is a different organization than the organization that did 9/11. Many of its field generals were incarcerated, were killed. We know a great deal about its financing, we know a great deal about its organization, and while this country is not safe, it is safer. But I would just suggest that we all remember that they only have to be right one time; we have to be right 100 percent of the time. And so that threat is not gone.

The challenges of Iran, the challenges of fighting terrorism, the challenges of democratization in the Middle East, these are all challenges that may go on for some time. One challenge that I would like to close my remarks with and is, of course, the challenge that – about Palestinian-Israeli peace, which is, after all, a very important element, one of the most important elements of a different kind of Middle East.

When I visited Israel for the first time, I remarked that I felt like I was going home to a place that I had never been. That is because our ties of kinship, our ties of religious connection,

and most importantly, our democratic values just grab hold of you when you are in Israel. You know that this is a place that has survived only by the toughness of its people and the grace of God. And Americans, as Harry was, are drawn to that. In being drawn to that, we were determined to let it be known that Israel would have a right to defend itself and that Israel had to be secured, and we let it be known that we thought that in the long run, Israel would be the most secure when it had a democratic neighbor to live side-by-side in peace that was a Palestinian state run by decent men and women who wanted a Middle East in which Israel was a part.

Those leaders began to emerge in Mahmoud Abbas and Salam Fayad, and while of course we were not able to deliver the Palestinian state, I would suggest that some very important things happened between 2001 and 2008. First of all, the recognition that a negotiated peace to a two-state solution really did begin to take hold in both places, and here I give tremendous, tremendous credit to Ariel Sharon.

I knew Ariel Sharon, and I liked him very, very much. He was a tough little tank-driver, but I'll tell a – yeah, kind of little, small tank-driver. And Ariel Sharon never told you he was going to do something that he wouldn't do. In fact, my last conversation with him was because I had been out to his farm to visit and he had taken this city girl to see his sheep. And I had never actually been up with a sheep, up close and personal, so it was kind of an interesting experience, and the last time that I talked to him, I said, how are your sheep, and he said, they miss you. (Laughter.)

Ariel Sharon told me another story. He told me that he had gone to the home of settlers during the decision to withdraw from Gaza, and they had a mezuzah above the door. And the man, the father, told him, how can you tell us to leave? He said, you personally put that mezuzah above the door, and you told us that settling this land was the right thing for Israel. Now, how can you ask us to leave? But he did ask them to leave, and he did come to believe in a two-state solution, and I think in doing so, he broadened the base of acceptance of the need to divide the land and to settle other issues. And that's a very important change in the psychology of the country.

And Palestinians, I think – not all of them, certainly not Hamas terrorist group that still wants the destruction of Israel – but many decent Palestinians accepted that only a negotiated solution would make life good for their people, and they renounced terrorism and they began to negotiate. When I last left that drama, they had made some agreements, tentative ones, but I think that you could see in the seriousness of the process of Annapolis that they know that the only solution, ultimately, is to have two states living side-by-side, and recognition of that is the most important first step to getting there.

I don't know how long it will take, but I know, too, that in the meantime, some very good things are going on. That same Nativity Square, where there was a whole blown into the Church of the Nativity, was the site a year ago of a conference of business investors in the West Bank. Fifteen-hundred people in it, open-air dinner, Arabs and Israelis alike there to talk about business opportunities.

When I went, I saw Jenin, a city that was synonymous with the intifada. And there, the United States had helped to build a hospital, and there, Palestinian security forces were actually taking up their post with dignity and without corruption. And when Hamas called for a day of rage during the events in Gaza, it was Palestinian security forces in the West Bank who interposed themselves between Jewish populations and the IDF and Palestinian populations. That is a remarkable story.

And finally, there was the matter of the community centers for kids. When I went to meet with the cabinet of Salam Fayad, their youth and sports minister said that they needed a safe place for kids to be after school, because if there isn't a safe place in Chicago or New Orleans or New York, kids can be given over to gang warfare or whatever. If there isn't a safe place in Jenin or in Bethlehem or in Ramallah, kids can be given over to being suicide bombers. And she was right. And the Boys and Girls Clubs of America worked with us and with technology companies to create community centers. And as I looked at these Palestinian kids, I thought that their mothers, too, want them to grow up to go to university. Their mothers, too, want them to grow up and have a decent life and families of their own. And somehow, Hamas' call that they really should grow up and blow themselves up and young Israelis too ultimately is not going to have much staying power with this population.

I don't mean to suggest that any of this is easy or immediate. It may take a long time. But it's important to keep our eye on the small things that are happening underneath. On the picture of Prime Minister Olmert speaking at Annapolis and Saud al-Faisal applauding, of King Abdullah sitting through the speech of President Peres of Israel. To remember that there are still great evils and terrorists and in a regime in Iran that frankly seems irreconcilable and seems unable to accept that the great people of Iran deserve to live in a world of peace, not in one in which Iran is the greatest sponsor of terrorism around the world, as their economy gets worse and worse.

And so there are small things there. But I'd like to close with just the following admonition, which is that that Middle East, just like a more hopeful outcome in any part of the world, will not come about without American leadership, because whatever you think about the policies of any one administration, whatever you think about policies that are undertaken, never lose sight of the fact that the United States of America is the most generous, the most compassionate, the freest company on the face of the Earth. And we need to remind people of that. We have sacrificed more for others than any other country. And we do it because perhaps we are a little bit naïve or idealistic.

We do it because it is who we are, coming as we do from so many countries and so many cultures and so many societies, we can't help but care about the world. We do it because it is in line with our values. But I think we do it also because we're basically an optimistic people, and where does that optimism come from? Well, first of all, it comes from the fact that the United States of America is still the only human experiment that does bring people from wherever they may have come here to be American. Whether you are Mexican-American or German-American or Korean-American, you're American, and that's very special in a world in which difference is a license to kill.

It is also a country that has a great national myth, and that – a myth is, by the way, not something that’s not true, it’s just something that’s a little bit outsized. And that myth is, it doesn’t matter where you came from, it matters where you’re going. It’s the log cabin. It’s the myth that you can come from small and from humble circumstances and do great things. It is, by the way, a myth that is only true if education provides the framework in which children who are from humble circumstances can do great things. It’s a belief in being able to remake yourself, to come here whether you crawled across the desert to make \$5, not 50 cents, or whether you came from Russia, as Sergey Brin, and founded Google in the United States, not in Russia. It is a great national myth that holds us together because it’s not by blood or by religion or by nationality, it is by an ideal that we’re held together.

And so as I look at America, I think that we have reason for optimism, but one reason that I loved being with the kids today is that I can see what education is doing to their minds. I can see what education is doing to their horizons. I can see that they don’t see any limits on who they might become. And if that is true for every American child, if that child sees no limit on who they might become, we’ve got reasons, great reasons, for optimism for a long time to come. Because after all, the country that came into being, and never probably should have, by defeating the greatest military power of the time with a very audacious Declaration of Independence, the country that did that despite the fact that at any given time, a third of Washington’s forces were given over to smallpox, a country that went on to fight a civil war, losing hundreds of thousands of people on both sides and brothers on both sides of the conflict but emerged again, unified.

A country that went through a second founding so that a young girl born in Birmingham, Alabama, who didn’t go to an integrated classroom until she left and went to Denver or who couldn’t go into a motel or into a restaurant, that that little girl would actually grow up to be the second African-American secretary of state, and an America that just elected an African American as president, showing the whole world that we are capable of renewal and regeneration unknown, ever, by any other people in human history. It is not to brag about America that I say these things. We’ve had our troubles, we continue to have them, we have many problems to solve, and we make our mistakes. I know I’ve made my share of them. But if we remember that America’s leadership is need in the world not because we are perfect but because we seek to do good, I do believe that the day will come when the Middle East, too, will be a place where what seemed impossible will simply seem, in retrospect, inevitable. Thank you very much.

(Applause.)

LEON WIESELTIER: All right. I remember when we had lunch at your office I think about a month before you had left – just before your tenure at State was about to end. And we agreed that, in the eight years in which you served at the White House and at State, that history had been working overtime – that even by the standards of the acceleration of history to which we’ve all become accustomed, there’s been a lot of it recently.

And whether or not a crisis is a terrible thing to waste, a crisis is often a terrible thing. And you’ve been charged for eight years with coping, managing, solving and unseemly number of them. And I thought what we might do is kind of talk about some of them, beginning with

Israel and Palestine, since this is in honor and memory of Yitzhak Rabin, who was, as you said, a hero both of war and of peace, which makes him a truly extraordinary historical figure.

You know, I also regretted that you didn't play the piano, but I have to say that even more beautiful to my ears than Mozart and Beethoven is an optimistic analysis of the Israeli-Palestinian problem. (Laughter.) But what I wanted to do, without spoiling the mood, is go back to, I guess, the darkest year, certainly in your recent service, but in recent memory – aside from September 11, 2001, of course – was 2006. And I imagine that there was that morning when you got up and heard that Hamas had won a free and fair election.

And I wonder if you might talk a little about that in this way: Not just the Bush administration, but many Americans, believe that both democracy and peace should be objectives of American foreign policy, certainly in that part of the world, but more generally. And we can talk about the vicissitudes of democratization and so on, but on the morning that you learned that Hamas had won a free and fair election, what you learned was that the objective of peace had clashed directly with the objective of democracy. And I wondered what you thought at that time. I mean, was it a mistake to hold that election? And if it was not a mistake, what does Israel, what does America – what do we do about this problem?

MS. RICE: Well, yes, I was rather distressed the morning that I learned that Hamas had won the election. And because all the predictions had been – including by Hamas – that Fatah was going to win the elections, it was something of a surprise. But I think you have to think of these things, again, in a longer arc and ask, what is the alternative? Islam and the Middle East Arab states – Palestinians – are going to have to go through a period where their people are trusted to make decisions about who is going to govern them. And I don't believe the academic literature that says you lay institutions and all of these things first and then you get democracy.

I don't know how authoritarian states – maybe you get a benign dictator somewhere along the way that allows a slow – but in many cases, if you don't start and give people a chance, you're not going to get there. It was also the case, as I said, that politics was going on. One reason that Hamas won was that Hamas was better organized in the mosques and better organized in the madrassas than Fatah, which has been corrupted by Yasir Arafat, wasn't organized and went to the Palestinian people, who basically told them, you're corrupt – we're not putting you back in office.

Now, you don't fix that problem by not having elections. And I am afraid that we're probably going to have to tolerate some elections that don't turn out as we would have them as they go through a period of time of finding a balance between Islam and democracy or a coexistence between Islam and democracy. The good news about Iraq was that the first elections were pretty sectarian and the Islamists did well; the Islamists did far less well in the second set of elections. And so I think you just have to go through this period.

Now, I'll say one final thing: We did make one very big mistake. There was the thought that we should, as an international community, say to Hamas, if you win in the elections or if you're running in the elections, you cannot be an army unto yourself – you can't have – the only purchase on power and the instruments of violence has to be the state, and you're not it. The

Palestinians were worried that that might look that we were trying to keep Hamas out. The international community was united – including the Russians – united behind that standard.

And I think going to that standard for some of these Islamist groups would make a difference. It meant, then, once that had been done – once Hamas had won – that we could, as an international community, demand that they meet certain international standards. And that's why Hamas was isolated for so long and we never had a break in the quartet on that point.

MR. WIESELTIER: Insofar as Hamas, which is, in its governance, is obviously an essentially anti-democratic movement, because we know that anti-democratic movements can enjoy democratic legitimacy as the result of certain elections – but insofar as Hamas does continue to enjoy democratic legitimacy, is the implication then that in one way or another – above the table, below the table, directly or indirectly – that Israel or the United States must swallow the thought that we must deal with Hamas, or not?

MS. RICE: I'm opposed to it. I think, by the way, that they aren't getting democratic legitimacy. I think the one reason that they launched the coup against Fatah was that they were losing ground in Gaza. And I've had Palestinian friends say to me that the good thing about Hamas being elected is that they – instead of running the streets with their faces covered and waving green flags and being the great resistance, they demonstrate that, just like everybody else, they can't make the sewer system work.

And so some accountability does come with governance, and I think it was when the combination of their own lack of capabilities to govern and the pressure from the international community probably led them to do what they did in Gaza. So I don't actually think they are getting democratic legitimacy.

MR. WIESELTIER: How important do you think – how important an obstacle to a settlement do you think Israeli settlements in the territories are? I'll say this: I used to think that they were the obstacle. I now think that they are an obstacle. And I wonder what your analysis of that is.

MS. RICE: Well, they're a problem in that they sour the mood for negotiations – I think that's the biggest problem. But what I tried to get the Palestinians to focus on – and the Israelis, too, but the Palestinians in particular – let's decide what the territory of the Palestinian state will be, and then there won't be any Israeli settlements; there will be Israel and there will be Palestine. And I –

MR. WIESELTIER: So that Jews who wish to can live in Palestine?

MS. RICE: Well, yes, or more likely what will happen is that the Israeli government will make a deal in which some settlers have to move and many don't. As you remember, President Bush, in his statement supporting the Gaza withdrawal in April, 2004, made a statement that population realities on the ground would have to be taken into consideration in any deal. And that was really what that was meant to speak to, that the places around Israel that are not really

settlements – they are now, really, towns – might have to be accommodated and probably, the Palestinians will have to be accommodated with some swaps of land.

MR. WIESELTIER: When we met, you were an expert on Soviet nuclear forces and I had written an amateurish little book on deterrence. And a lot of what we thought we were writing then, after the end of the Cold War we kind of prayed would become obsolete. But I wanted to ask you about an aspect of nuclear deterrence that may not be obsolete, and that has, of course, to do with Iran. As you know, the pressure is mounting or the nerves are fraying or – but this is becoming, increasingly, a very, very volatile subject. And I wonder what is your view, first, of what the Iranians intend to do, and then what the Israelis intend to do and then what the Americans should do?

MS. RICE: Well, I think the – when I last left off, Israel and the United States sometimes had different assessments of exactly how long or – but basically, the diplomatic course which tries to raise the cost to Iran of continuing to pursue the technologies associated with nuclear weapons production, enrichment and reprocessing was the way that everyone was going. And I think he may be here – Stuart Levy was – there he is – also a proud father, I understand, at the school – but we had developed a set of measures to essentially deny Iran access to the international financial system.

When Treasury declares an Iranian bank or entity to be doing business with terrorists or in weapons of mass destruction, no bank can – worldwide, no bank can do business with that Iranian entity and do business with an American bank. So what you have is, you get people having to choose between their Iranian business and their American business and there virtually is no choice, right? That's not a choice. And so the costs to Iran are getting higher. You see it in the problems in the economy; you see it in the fact that they can't do anything to shore up their oil production; you see it in the fact that they import refined products despite the fact that they're sitting on what they do.

And so the hope is – and at this point, I have to say it's more hope than experience – is that there are, in fact, reasonable people in Iran – I didn't say moderate. Every bad American policy in the last 30 years has been looking for the moderates in Iran. I'm quite confident they don't exist. But there may be reasonable people who are willing to stop incurring those costs and to make a deal. And I think that's what you have to do.

MR. WIESELTIER: It is not unreasonable to hope that Iran could actually be bargained out of its nuclear ambitions?

MS. RICE: (Sighs.)

MR. WIESELTIER: I understand why you're sighing there.

MS. RICE: Yeah, it's hard to see, but what I do see is that the costs to Iran are growing and growing and growing. And I do see an election coming up in June which ought to be a barometer of whether or not the kind of Ahmadijad faction is in the pleasure of Khomeini or whether other factions may be gaining the other hand. And if you can get a better alignment

politically in Iran, then perhaps some deal is possible. I don't think it will be a perfect deal, but something may be possible.

MR. WIESELTIER: Yeah, I mean, the problem always is that every time the Iranians hold an election, one crosses one's fingers and hopes, and every time it gets worse.

MS. RICE: Right. But this time, they've been through a period of bad – really bad leadership. The other thing is, look, it can't just be about the nuclear file in Iran. One thing that the Arab states remind us is that Iran is also the central funder of Hezbollah, the central funder of really bad Hamas – the Jaburi faction down in Gaza, the special groups in Iraq. And so one concern is that you not trade the nuclear file for some kind of acquiescence or acceptance of Iran's aggressive behavior in the Middle East. Iran lost big in Iraq. Its allies didn't do very well. And so there are a lot of pressures growing on them. We'll see. We'll see in June.

MR. WIESELTIER: But from the Israeli standpoint, an Iranian nuclear capability is a terrifying, existential threat. On the other hand, when one reads the Israeli debate, one sees – it's quite interesting, actually – more and more Israelis are talking about – beginning to contemplate the possibility of living in a regime of nuclear deterrence with Iran, because, I guess, of the implacable will towards nuclearization that the Iranians seem to be exhibiting. Do you think that Israelis could – can you imagine a stable regime of nuclear deterrence with Iran?

MS. RICE: You know, were it not for Iran's agenda in the Middle East, one might play around with some concept like that, but I've never been able to see how, given Iran's agenda, which is bound to make them clash repeatedly with Israel and, by the way, a number of the Arab states, that the kind of stable nuclear deterrence that we associate with the Soviet Union and the United States could obtain in the Middle East – I don't see it. Now, we need to remember that what we're talking about right now, today, in Iran is not a nuclear weapon.

It's not even a latent one. What we're talking about is the technology and capability to enrich fuel to the point that it can be used for a nuclear weapon. The part of the problem that we have is that enrichment of nuclear fuel, if it's only enriched to about 5 or 6 percent, then it can be used for a civilian nuclear reactor – no problem. If it's enriched to 97 or 98 percent, then it can be used in a nuclear weapon, because the material has to be very pure for a nuclear weapon. The problem is that it is the same know-how to go 5 or 6 percent that it is to go to 97 percent. It's an engineering problem to go to 97 percent, not a science problem. So I admit, it's very dire. But I do again – the costs are high for Iran and it may well be that something's there.

MR. WIESELTIER: I remember at the same lunch that we had, we were kind of spinning the globe, and I asked you what, if you were to leave a not for your successor on your desk, what would you tell her to be most worried about. And without skipping a beat, you said rather presciently, you said Pakistan and Mexico. And I wonder if you could talk a little bit about – I mean, you could start with the worst, if you want to talk about Pakistan?

MS. RICE: Well, Pakistan is just such a fragile entity. You know, having been carved as it was, essentially, out of India, its identity has always been a problem and its always – not always, but some elements in Pakistan find their identity through extremism and through extreme

anti-India sentiment. So there are some people for which there is no – for whom there is no positive agenda for Pakistan; it's all about aggression and aggrievement.

I think that the only way to deal with this is – there's a long-term problem – long-term possibility – got to deal with those madrassas and get better education for Pakistani kids, you've got to – India and Pakistan – India, I believe, wants no part of a crisis any longer. I think they've moved on to other things, like Bollywood. (Laughter.) You know, they don't really want a crisis. And so you've got to use that.

You've got to do something to – long-term – to just keep pressing civilian government to hold in Pakistan. But in order to do that, it is just an everyday exercise to get up and deal with whatever critical, acute problem there is in Pakistan. These longer-term things – economic development, educational development – that's all going to take time.

But right now, the problem is – our problem was that the Pakistani economy was about to collapse – and so we did all kinds of things with the Asian Development Bank and we sort of put them on better footing – and the IMF and so forth. The next day, you may find that you're dealing with the crisis in Swat. The next day, you may find you're dealing with the crisis that they're 60 kilometers from Islamabad. And so it is just a daily management problem – that's the way it is.

MR. WIESELTIER: Talk a little bit about that, because not just in your term, but in recent decades, for many reasons, one sometimes gets the impression that American foreign policy at the highest levels is essentially a process of crisis management, and that when you talk about the long arc of history, that the implication of that is some good, old-fashioned, classical formulation of strategy which can be formulated in some peace and quiet, which history allows one. And more and more, one just – well, certainly in your last few years at State, you seemed to be living in an airplane.

MS. RICE: I did.

MR. WIESELTIER: And how does – I mean, I don't know – and it probably does need to be done – the genie's out of the bottle – but foreign policy as crisis management is a problematic thing, isn't it?

MS. RICE: Foreign policy as crisis management is, but I think it's always been foreign policy as crisis management. It's why I tell the story about the '40s. That was foreign policy by crisis management, but they had some basic things that they were trying to do. They were pressing for a democratic Germany; they were pressing for a free-market economic system in Europe; they were pressing for European Union; they were pressing for rearming of Germany, for building NATO.

So they were doing some things that were clearly going to have a longer-term perspective, a longer-term impact, and eventually, then, they did see those come to fruition. But on any given day, it was just dealing with the crisis of the moment. And so you have to operate on two levels.

MR. WIESELTIER: But don't you find – and you don't look back sometimes, despite all of the nerve-jangling events that you just described – the Cold War still sometimes, in retrospect, looks like an ancient period of common stability compared to what we have now.

MS. RICE: Well, by the time you and I were *mentis compos*, which we won't say when that was, but by that time, it was. I mean, the Soviet Union was a kind of almost tired power that was throwing its weight around, but the idea that you might have war between the United States and the Soviet Union was pretty remote. I think the problem with the crises that we were managing – but you are then at the kind of – almost at the end of an historical epoch that had begun with a lot of hot crises in the '40s.

We're at the beginning of an historical epoch and that's dangerous because there are a lot of un-reconciled – the Iranians are not reconciled to who they are and where they are. That's a problem, because they will do things that are more aggressive than a state that sort of accepts where it is. And then you have the kind of nihilist movements like al Qaeda, which, by the way, do have a political program. It's to re-establish the caliphate in the center of the Arab world.

And one reason that defeating them in Iraq is important is that these millenarian movements need more than just victories; they actually need to be able to show historical momentum – they have to be able to claim that history is moving their way. And if they are knocked back in the center of the Arab world, not just by Arab forces, but by Iraqis, that's a huge problem for them in terms of their historical inevitability. The Soviet Union, really, was much easier to deal with once it was clear that it didn't have a historically inevitable outcome in its favor. That is, I think, where we are with al Qaeda.

MR. WIESELTIER: Since you mention al Qaeda, I wonder – I know you're beginning to collect your thoughts and materials for a memoir – I wonder if you can talk a little bit, not about – at the policy level at all, but the darkest day must have been September 11th, September 12th, 2001. And I wonder if you could talk a little bit about just what it felt like to be there on that day and on the day after that day?

MS. RICE: Well, on that day, I received a call that a plane had hit the World Trade Center. I thought, what a terrible accident. I called the president who was in Georgia. It was ironic, Steve Hadley and I – almost always, one of us traveled with the president – that day, he was just going to Georgia for a few hours, so we didn't. And then I heard a second plane had hit the World Trade Center. And they came and they said, you've got to get to the bunker. I turned around, a plane had hit the Pentagon. There were false reports of a suicide bombing at the State Department.

MR. WIESELTIER: Oh, there were?

MS. RICE: Yes. We got, then, to – got into the presidential management center and it was just trying to ground those planes – Norm Mineta trying to ground the entire system. We thought we'd shot down that plane that went down in Pennsylvania – that was an awful moment.

By the end of the day, it was just – you know, you’re just shell-shocked. And I remained shell-shocked for several days after.

And the two things that you come away with is, number one, you tell yourself you did what you could, but you believe it intellectually and never quite in your heart, because it happened on your watch. And the second thing is, you say you don’t ever want it to happen again and so you will do everything that is possible – and in this context, I want to say and legal

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MR. WIESELTIER: We’ll get to that, yeah.

MS. RICE: To – right – in order to be able to protect the country. Because the pictures of Americans jumping out of 80-story buildings to get out of the collapsing towers is something I’ll never forget.

MR. WIESELTIER: Yeah, I remember thinking – I mean, there are people who worked with you in the White House who I don’t especially admire – but I remember thinking that if I were the president or the vice president on September 12th, 2001, I would have taken a sacred oath to defend this country to the very utmost of what is possible.

MS. RICE: Look, every day after September 11th is September 12th. The president said something that I really agree with not too long ago – President Bush said something that I really agree with not too long ago. He said, you know, people have said we didn’t ask people to sacrifice; we wanted Americans to go on. We wanted people to be able to get back on planes. We wanted people to go back to school. We didn’t want America held hostage to the terrorists. But the fact is, America could go on only if we didn’t – only if, every day, we got up and we were determined not to let it happen.

And you know, since, as I said, they have to be right once and you have to be right 100 percent of the time, that’s a really difficult task. I am grateful – I did not say proud, I said grateful – that an attack did not happen again on our watch. But it could have and several times, it could have.

MR. WIESELTIER: Well then, okay – the “T-word.” As you know, the debate about torture or enforced interrogation techniques – call it what you want – is ripping up the political discussion here and around the country. You haven’t spoken a lot about it, but I can say now that we saw this afternoon that the Times has just posted an article that gives the history of a certain degree of dissension in the Bush administration about this matter. And that reports two things that I would mention – first that, I think it was early on, there was a disagreement between you and the vice president about acknowledging the CIA –

MS. RICE: Yeah, it was somewhat later.

MR. WIESELTIER: Later, yeah. And acknowledging them and then taking them to Guantanamo. And you won that debate. And then it also noted – and I don’t know if you want to talk more about this – that in 2001, you – 2007 – you refused to sign an executive order that

called for renewing the controversial program. I wonder if you would talk a little bit about this issue, I mean, than which there is no more sensitive issue?

MS. RICE: Well, I don't want to get into our internal deliberations, but let me put it this way: This is really hard, right? This is a very hard issue. And I think the debate about it is appropriate and I don't have any problem debating it. I was asked this by a Stanford student, famously now, on YouTube. And I thought two things: I thought you know, good, we should be talking about this. I also thought I need to work on my professorial skills a little bit – I think I've been in Washington a little too long in the way that I talked to the student.

But I do think that it is important to do this in a context of remembering the times and in giving people the benefit of the doubt that these were people of good will – and I mean everybody who was doing this – who had the hardest possible dilemmas and choices before them. There were second-wave attacks planned. We knew virtually nothing about how al Qaeda operated. We were as deaf and dumb and blind on September 10th as you could possibly be.

Now, the president in that context – in that circumstance – said what more can we do to protect the country? But he was very clear every time I talked to him – every time he talked to any of us – but it has to be within our legal obligations – both our international obligations and our domestic obligations. That is why we saw an opinion from the Justice Department and ultimately, from the attorney general himself, about what our obligations were and what the agency was proposing and how – whether or not this was legal.

Now, there's been another confusing statement – I said at one point that it was, therefore, a given that the president – if the president authorized it, it was legal. This was not a Nixon/Frost moment. What I intended to say or what I meant to say about this is, the president said I won't authorize anything that is illegal. It's not that because he authorized it, it was legal. No, that's a tautology. It was that he said, I won't authorize anything that's illegal.

Now, these were hard decisions. This was tough stuff – frankly, the kinds of stuff I never thought, you know, I would be talking about or debating. And it evolved over time. It – once the threat environment was different, which it was as we knew more about al Qaeda, and as the legal framework shifted, particularly after Senator McCain's legislation, which I supported Senator McCain's legislation, this program evolved and evolved and evolved.

But to this – to the day we left, the president wanted to do everything that he could to protect the country and protect the country legally. It's not surprising that, over a period of time, some of us were insistent on – and there was no resistance to it – insistent on really discussing what still needed to be done and what didn't. And so the program evolved quite dramatically in that period of time.

MR. WIESELTIER: And so you had misgivings, in other words. This was never a morally easy question.

MS. RICE: It was never – no, of course it was never an easy question. But in 2002, if you have the president's foreign intelligence advisor saying we have these threats and we need to

do it and you have the attorney general saying it's legal, in that set of circumstances, I still believe that it would have been hard to say no. But of course, these are very difficult questions. You have the dilemma and you have the dilemma of not knowing how else you can protect a country that, at that time, was still quite vulnerable – quite vulnerable.

MR. WIESELTIER: I have the duty and the pleasure of reading you some questions that have been submitted.

MS. RICE: All right.

MR. WIESELTIER: But the most important one is the first one because it comes from the student council president of JPDS, the commander-in-chief, who is Hanna Weisler (sp). And Hanna would like to ask you this. Her question is, well, this is good – she asks you, “What do you think that you and President Obama have in common?” – aside from the obvious thing, of course.

MS. RICE: Right.

MR. WIESELTIER: Yes, I know, your interest in music.

MS. RICE: Yeah. (Chuckles.)

MR. WIESELTIER: What do you think you do not have in common?

MS. RICE: We obviously have a lot in common. He was – President Obama was, when he was senator, on my committee, on Foreign Relations, which oversaw the State Department. And so I talked to him a number of times. He's a really very curious, interesting, quite good interlocutor. And I enjoyed our conversations.

I remember after my confirmation hearings, I actually said, you know, he actually wanted to know the answer to the question; he didn't just want to ask the question. So it was – I have a lot of admiration and respect for him. I think we have a lot in common. We both love the country and I think we both love basketball, which is a good thing.

Interestingly, I think the thing we actually don't have in common is that we come from two different strains in the black experience.

MR. WIESELTIER: Could you talk about that a little?

MS. RICE: His is, of course, of mixed race parents in places like Hawaii and Indonesia. And mine is the slave narrative, you know, the descendant of slaves narrative, which is obviously a different narrative than his. But it's quite clear to me that the core, which is that the United States needed a second founding with civil rights because the original Constitution, my ancestors were three-fifths of a man, I think we – that, out of both of those narratives, you get to that.

But I do think there are slight variations. And, by the way, there is a third black narrative, which is Colin Powell's, which is Jamaican immigrants. So we have several different narratives in the black community and that's – so.

MR. WIESELTIER: This question is on the assumption that the Bush administration tried to do the right thing during its watch, but that everyone makes mistakes. What do you think was the most serious mistake the Bush administration made?

MS. RICE: Well, I've said it, you know, it's going to take a while to probably catalogue all of them because, if you're in office for eight years and you have turbulent times, you'll make mistakes.

One that comes to mind for me almost immediately, though, is I think – look, I would have liberated Baghdad 100 times over. I think it was the right decision. Our assumptions about what would be left were actually not right. We thought that we would be able to take the heads off of these ministries – Saddam's henchmen – and there would be this civil service still in place.

And I remember standing at my desk saying to people, uh, where are the oil workers? What do you mean, there are no oil workers? Because the place collapsed. And we then had to sort of put in place artificial governance structures.

MR. WIESELTIER: So you're saying we sort of collapsed it.

MS. RICE: Well, it collapsed. I think we thought it would hold together in some fashion because they did have a civil service but, instead, we ended up trying to use the civil service, use our own people to be their civil service. We were therefore way too focused on Baghdad.

You know, for a people that believe in federalism, you would never, if you live in Gaithersburg, you would never expect Washington to fix your sewer system yet, somehow, in the way we conceived of the reconstruction of Iraq, we conceived of it as all being out of Baghdad. I think part of it is, too, that we weren't very good at counterinsurgency and we didn't realize, you don't fight the war and it's over and then you build the peace; it's more like a continuum.

In some places you get rid of the bad guys, bring in reconstruction, bring in governance all at the same time. And we finally got the right structures in 2005 when we put provincial reconstruction teams, which were civilians and aid workers, into brigade commands and then they would go out and they would help the local people.

So I just think we conceived of the reconstruction wrong.

MR. WIESELTIER: I mean, I don't know what it is about counterinsurgency doctrine that every time we learn it, we immediately forget it, since the –

MS. RICE: Yes, that's right – and have to learn it again.

MR. WIESELTIER: It will not stick. It's not –

MS. RICE: That's right.

MR. WIESELTIER: Since the Philippines, right, it will not stick. But I think you would agree that in some way, the premise of the success of a good deal of President Obama's foreign policy will now be the relative success of the surge in Iraq because if, in fact, that had not worked, the whole world would be talking about nothing else; America's position in the world would be very different.

Did you, in your heart, did you think it would work?

MS. RICE: In my heart I was worried. I was worried. I thought that if the surge did not work then we had played our last card. I also was worried that – I was concerned – and the president and the team, I think we got this concern allayed – I was concerned that more troops were a good idea; I always thought more troops were a good idea; but they had to do something different.

We couldn't just keep doing what we were doing with more troops. And I think the counterinsurgency doctrine that David Petraeus and Ray Odierno and some other generals that had been there and come back developed so that more troops meant something different; it meant population security as a goal, not just security for military people. It meant being able to go out into the provinces and do this work. I think that's why it worked.

MR. WIESELTIER: We have a question about football, but it doesn't seem appropriate to a synagogue, so I'm moving on. Here's one: "As the daughter of a Presbyterian minister and a regular attendee of Presbyterian churches, how do you feel about the Presbyterian Church USA's decision in 2005 to selectively divest from companies that provide products and services to the Israeli police or military?"

MS. RICE: I fundamentally disagreed with it and it's not the first time I've disagreed with the general assembly of the Presbyterian Church USA. The good thing about the Presbyterian Church is it's governed locally and your congregation is the important thing. You're governed by elders who are elected by the church, by a minister who you call. And, therefore, you know, I can live with it, but I fundamentally disagreed with it and think it was a terrible idea.

MR. WIESELTIER: Here's a question that I'm going to formulate just a little bit differently, but I'm going to ask it to you this way: What do you think is the place and the magnitude and the effect of anti-Semitism in the world today?

MS. RICE: Still there. Still there. And I think has to be called out when you see it. It's there, of course, in some of the really horrible things that are taught in Arab schools, which we have tried and tried and tried to get curriculum reform done. And I think you'll see that Palestinians are doing more on this front than almost anybody else, which is a good thing. But that's a very evident piece of it.

You still have in places in Europe a kind of latent and sometimes not-so-latent anti-Semitism. It's why President Bush had proposed and the OECD took up a conference on anti-Semitism that we've been – OSC – sorry, on anti-Semitism that's been running ever since. We personally did a lot of work with Abe Foxman in the Anti-Defamation League. It's ever present – fortunately, I think, not so much in most governments anymore, at least certainly not in official policy, but it comes in small ways in the criticisms of policies that are, quote, “too pro-Israel” and so forth.

MR. WIESELTIER: But there are, when you do the map, when you spin the globe “Jewishly,” as it were, there are certain states in which I think there are grounds for worry about certain Jewish communities in Venezuela, Iran –

MS. RICE: I think Venezuela, Iran –

MR. WIESELTIER: And Russia.

MS. RICE: And Russia, which continues to –

MR. WIESELTIER: Because Russia is turning out to be a lot like Russia. (Laughter.) One of the things that I thought you might talk about briefly is Putin because, in your time in service at this very high level, you had the magical experience of meeting with him.

MS. RICE: I spent a lot of time with Vladimir Putin over the years.

MR. WIESELTIER: So maybe you could tell us just – well, go ahead.

MS. RICE: You know, I think what has happened in Russia – first of all, let me just say, it's not the Soviet Union. I was a graduate student in the Soviet Union. It's not the Soviet Union.

MR. WIESELTIER: But that's very faint praise.

MS. RICE: Right, that's faint praise. It is a disappointment that both in terms of its domestic development, which has turned more authoritarian and in its foreign policy there are strains that are so troubling. Now, we actually don't have problems with the Russians on things like the Middle East; they were very good, very good on North Korea, actually, not so bad on Iran, maybe better than advertised on Iran.

MR. WIESELTIER: Really?

MS. RICE: Oh, yes, better than advertised on Iran. I think they were giving the right messages to Iran. They structured Bushehr in a way, the nuclear reactor, in a way that would not have had proliferation risks. They were very good in counterterrorism work, very good in nuclear work. Where you get in trouble with Russia is around its periphery because the Russians basically want to – this group of Russians want to avenge the loss in the Cold War. And that

means, if you want to put missile defense in Turkey, be our guest. If you want to put it in Poland and the Czech Republic, not permissible because they used to be members of the Warsaw Pact.

Georgia, Ukraine, Central Asia – American military base in Kyrgyzstan? Buy it out. So that's where the problems come with Russia. And that's going to be the clash because, with all due respect to doing a new arms control agreement with Russians, which is not a bad thing to do; I don't mean to suggest it is a bad thing to do, but, you know, it's not the crux of the problem with Russia. The crux of the problem with Russia is its domestic development, its use of oil as a weapon, its tendency to try to beat up on its small neighbors and its desire to keep the United States out of its, quote, "special sphere."

So this is not going to be easy to do with Russia. But the good news is that with the lower price of oil, Russia is one of the many petro states that I think has a little less swagger these days than they used to. And one good thing about that is that the legitimacy of Vladimir Putin is very much built on order and prosperity. And Russians, who have greater personal freedom than they've ever had, Russians who can travel, Russians who can get a 30-year mortgage, Russians who can buy things at that Ikea store that now covers up the tank traps that were the furthest march of the Soviet – or the German army, they're going to insist that the prosperity piece continue. And that will, I think, diminish some of the popularity of Vladimir Putin and perhaps leave an opening for Medvedev, who I do think is a little different.

MR. WIESELTIER: He will be brought down by something similar to what brought down his communist predecessors, which is –

MS. RICE: Not being able to provide.

MR. WIESELTIER: Yeah, yeah. We have time for two more questions. The first one is this. The question is: "What is your view of President Obama's decision to send more troops to Afghanistan and, more generally, what is your view about what needs to be done in Afghanistan?"

MS. RICE: Well, I've said that I will give any advice privately to the administration, but, on this one, it's kind of easy: a good thing to do. And I think it would have happened regardless; I think we would have done the same thing.

But Afghanistan is going to take a long time. Afghanistan is – depending on how you count, about the fifth-poorest country in the world. The others are in sub-Saharan Africa. If you fly over Afghanistan, you see that they were bequeathed high mountains and dirt; that's basically it. It is a country with few resources and no economy except the poppy trade. It has been at war for 30 years and it has – it's trying to come to terms with Islam and democracy, personal freedom and religious diktat all at the same time that it's fighting this horrible insurgency, the Taliban.

But the Taliban is a hit-and-run bunch these days. They aren't able to mass and do the kinds of things that they once were able to do. And so more troops that can also, as we did in

Iraq, focus on population security; that is, focus on holding a part of territory so people can live there, feel safe, govern and so forth.

You are going to have to continue to fight the corruption; you are going to have to continue to fight the poppy trade. But you're going to just have to realize that this is a country that is going to have a lot of back and forth, ups and downs, for a long time because it's very poor.

I'll just give you one statistic. The Iraqi budget for 2008 – declined somewhat now because of – sorry, 2009 – declined somewhat now because of oil prices, but was to be about \$49 billion. The budget for Afghanistan with a couple of million more people was \$678 million. And so that just shows you how very poor this country is. So we're going to be struggling there for a long time. But as long as you can prevent the Taliban from making strategic victories and as long as you can do something about Pakistan and that border, I think, eventually, it will work in Afghanistan.

MR. WIESELTIER: Well, if doing something about Pakistan is the answer, then there's no reason to worry because they are –

MS. RICE: Well, at least Northwest Frontier, yeah.

MR. WIESELTIER: And, final question, I guess it's appropriate since you shared your worst memory of your years at the White House, one of our friends here would like to know what your best memory from your years at the White House was?

MS. RICE: Well, let me just answer that in two parts. The best part about serving in the government, but especially secretary of state, is that you get to go out and you get to represent this great country. And, you know, I really love this country and I love what we stand for and I know we're not perfect, but I think, as I said, I think we are trying to do good and I love representing the country.

George Shultz once told me that the secretary of state is the best job in government; he was right. It's a terrific job. And so I can remember many times, you know, getting off the plane and going to a place that was deeply troubled like going to Chengdu in China after the earthquake and having a little 12-year-old boy come up to me and say, you're that lady from America. And I thought, oh, that's really cool.

And, very often, it was the kids that somehow I – you know, I loved being with the leaders –

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